This paper describes a coding scheme developed for a specific su.uercomputer architecture and structure. The code considered is a shortened (b,k)-adjacent single-error-correcting double-errorprobabilistic-detecting code with b = 5, k = 1, and code group width = 4. An evaluation of the probabilistic double-error-detection capability of the code was performed for drfferent organizations of the codingldecoding strategies for the codewords. This led to the selection of a system organization encompassing the traditional feature of memory data error protection and also providing for the detection of major addressing errors that may result from faults affecting the interconnection network communication modules. The cost of implementation is a limited amount of extra hardware and a negligible degradation in the double-error-detection properties of the code.
Introduction
The requirement of superfast performance for large-scale supercomputing systems has led to the development of new types of highly parallel architectures: tens (or more) of processors concurrently working on different parts of the same problem. This trend has been necessitated by the speed limitations of computer technologies, such as gallium arsenide or Josephson junction devices, which can increase computer speed only by about a factor of 10 with current uniprocessor architectures [ 1,2], whereas multiprocessor architectures have the potential of providing much larger speed increases, from 1 0 0 to 1000 times the current speed.
With these new architectures, the analysis of systems such as fusion power reactors, turbulent flow around ships or planes, and weather analysis and prediction would be possible on a three-dimensional basis, applications that are practically unmanageable with today's computer performance. Also, it should be noted that the solution of such 3-D models would require not only ultrahigh speed but also a very large primary memory of capacity up to 10" words [3] . With such largecapacity memories, the problem of data protection against the effects of errors becomes one of great significance requiring particular attention.
The study presented in this paper constitutes a contribution to this problem; it has been developed in the framework of a large ongoing project, currently funded in France, for research and development in supercomputer systems. A core machine is currently being developed to serve as a basis upon which more powerful systems can be built. It is a multiple-instructionstream, multiple-data-system (MIMD) machine intended for scientific computation and designed to act as an array processor when connected to a host computer system. This machine is expected to provide an average computation speed of more than twenty million floating-point operations per second (20 MFLOPS). The development of a machine aimed at an average computation speed in excess of 100 MFLOPS and featuring more than lo8 words of primary memory is being planned.
Clearly, with such a structure, the error-tolerance characteristics of main memory have to be carefully investigated. Along these lines, a preliminary study was performed to identify and apply possible solutions in the case of the core machine. Although more restricted in size, this structure features most of the characteristics to be considered for the development of a coding scheme that could be applied in future upgraded systems. This study and the results obtained are presented in this paper.
For this computer system, the choice of the code to protect information depends more upon the structural features of the core machine than upon the main memory features, so the core computer system will be briefly described. As shown in Topyright 1984 by International Business Machines Corporation. Copying in printed form for private use is permitted without payment of royalty provided that (1) each reproduction is done without alteration and (2) the Journal reference and IBM copyright notice are included on the first page. The title and abstract, but no other portions, of this paper may be copied or distributed royalty free without further permission by computer-based and other information-service systems. Permission to republish any other portion of this paper must be obtained from the Editor. Omega-type interconnection network [4] , to I6 memory modules (Ma, MI, . . . , MIS) which constitute the primary memory of the system. The processor modules are composed of standard array processors. Each such processor has a small local memory protected by a single-error-correcting, double-errordetecting (SEC-DED) modified Hamming code [5-71. The Omega-type network was selected in order to provide an acceptable tradeoff between the amount of hardware and the necessary control complexity, flexibility, rearrangeability, delay, etc. [8, 9] . The memory modules are characterized by a capacity of 1M words of 64 bits each. These modules are composed of four banks of 64 data modules, each data module one bit wide and containing 256K bits. Initially, a SEC-DED modified Hamming code was envisioned for data protection.
In practice, the conceptual network of The main structural modifications intended in order to reach higher performance levels are 1) increasing the number of primary memory modules to about one hundred and providing double access capability, 2) including a stage of specific computing modules, each connected to a memory module, working in single-instruction-stream, multiple-datastream (SIMD) mode, and 3) extending the network connecting primary memory modules with the array processor modules working in MIMD mode.
The major influences of these modifications on the problem of primary memory protection are related to I ) the increase in the number of memory modules and in the resulting capacity of the primary memory, and 2) the increase in the size of the network. Both factors would tend to make the system much less reliable and available. It thus appears that basically the same problems have to be solved for both structures in order to derive an efficient error-correcting scheme. This allows methods which may provide sufficiently high system availability for the upgraded machine to be tested and evaluated on the core machine.
Determining the error correction and detection techniques for the data transmission and storage subsystem of the core system began with a study of the effects of the failures of single components. Both the local memories in the sixteen processors and the memory modules will be implemented by I-bit-wide data modules; therefore, single failures will produce single errors, and standard Hamming SEC-DED codes would suffice. However, as stated previously, for circuit efficiency in the Omega network, four bits are switched in parallel. Thus, a single component failure in one slice of the Omega network could produce any one of the fifteen possible error patterns in the four bits of data, address, or control information being transmitted through that slice. Therefore, a single-bit SEC-DED code is inappropriate for transmissions between the processors and the main storage modules. A solution is to use a code which is SEC-DED for groups of four bits [ 1 I].
A practical implementation consideration was that the planned SEC-DED code for the 64-bit-wide data words in the main memory uses eight check bits, and any code chosen for implementation should use a comparable number of check bits, as well as a comparable amount of circuitry and number of logic levels. In addition, the code chosen must have error correction and detection power near that of a single-bit SEC-DED code, but over groups of four bits.
The usual solution for error correction and detection over groups of b bits is to use a Reed-Solomon b-adjacent code The addition of k check bits increases the maximum number of data bits that can be handled by more than a factor of 2k.
If b = 5 and k = 1, then data in 4-bit-wide groups will be corrected, and the maximum length of data which may be corrected is 4(3 1) = 124 bits.
The difficulty of detecting errors in two distinct b-bit-wide groups may be solved as follows. It is well known that errorcorrection codes operating on shortened data have a probability of detecting multiple errors which are not corrected. The ability of b-adjacent and (b,k)-adjacent codes to perform such detection was discussed in [ 15, 171 and was seen to be quite high. The double-error detecting ability of a shortened SEC code depends on the shortened code chosen from the SEC code of maximum length. For a (b,k)-adjacent SEC code of length qd there are can correct all 15 error patterns in 4-bit-wide groups, can cover as information the 84 bits needed for parallel transmission of the 64 data bits and 20 address bits used in the core machine, can detect many double errors involving two 4-bitwide data groups (with arbitrary data patterns), and uses only nine check bits for each word in main memory. Since such a code satisfies all the practical system requirements for availability, except possibly high enough probability of double-error detection, it was decided to investigate the properties of such a code, devise and compare specific codes, and determine if the probabilistic four-adjacent double-error detection would be sufficient to fulfill the core system availability requirements, considering the relative probability of occurrence of single and multiple four-adjacent errors. The shortened length chosen must have length 4 X 2 1. There are (i;) = 44 352 165 possible choices for such a code.
In the following sections of this paper we first describe the procedure for generating the specific code as well as that of exploiting the syndrome to identify the error. The doubleerror-detection properties of the code are then examined, using a systematic investigation of the error combinations that allow evaluation of the double-error-detection probability. Following that, different implementations of the code are examined and evaluated on the basis of their double-error-detection capabilities. These implementations differ by 1) the coding scheme, which may include only data lines or both data and address lines in the generation of the check bits, the latter taking into account faults affecting the commutation modules that convey the address lines in the network; and 2) the decoding scheme, which, depending on the use of the redundancy of the code, may correct all bits of the codeword or may correct data and check bits only, to satisfy different architectural requirements.
Description of the code
General background Let q = b -k be the code group bit width for a (b,k)-adjacent code. The panty check matrix for such a code can be written as 
If
These properties of the companion matrix allow for an easy derivation of its distinct powers, since w = 2 -1, C! = Cb = I b 1161.
Construction of the code and derivation of the decoding expressions As previously mentioned, a consideration of the possible errors which may occur because of the architecture of the supercomputers being designed shows that a single fault in the Omegatype interconnection network can cause from one to four faults in a group of four adjacent bits in a memory unit. Thus, for single-error correction, any of the 15 possible error patterns in such four-adjacent groups must be corrected. The supercomputers have a word length of 64 bits, which must be divided into 4-bit code groups. A standard b-adjacent code 162 with b = 4 cannot be used since the maximum data length for such a code is 60 bits. Thus a (b,k)-adjacent code with b = 5 and k = 1 was chosen. This code handles code data groups of
, and has a maximum data length of 124
bits. This flexibility in length is exploited, as described in subsequent sections.
The specific check matrix is easily deduced from the general matrix (3) and can be written as where r is determined by the number of data bits that are considered by the relation r = rrn/bl -I , ( r I 30).
The companion matrix is derived from the primitive polynomial p(x) = 1 + x2 + x5, (6) and all the distinct powers can be easily obtained following the previously described method. In practice, the choice of the C& among the Cjs can be made arbitrarily, provided that in all cases the same column is deleted. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that this choice presents a direct influence on 1) the hardware implementation complexity of the code, and 2) its multiple group error detection abilities. The constraints related to the latter condition cannot be simply identified at this stage and are addressed in the next section. Thus, the selection of the matrices was based on the first influence only and ended in the correspondence between matrices C+ and C& indicated in Table 1 , where the C;,< are actually obtained by deletion of the fifth column in the associated C+. Note that only C;,< matrices, which are used in the different implementations of the code, have been considered here.
The logical equations for the generation of the check bits can be derived easily from the matrix H". In the following, B, is used in place of C&, for conciseness of the presentation; furthermore, the symbols + and Z are used to represent addition modulo-2, i.e., exclusive-or, while the symbols . and n represent the logical AND operation, v and U represent the logical OR, and -represents negation. The bits of the syndrome vector (so+,) are then identified by i = 0, I , . . ., r, (8) where db and c;, 0 s k 5 8 , have been used instead of do and ck to account for possible errors that could affect data and check bits. Considering an error vector (ep, ejl, eJ2, ej3)', corresponding to any error combination that affects data group j , j = 0, I , . . . , r, then the following expressions apply:
(so, S I , s2, sdT = (ep, ejl, eJ2, ejd', Equation (9) allows the determination of faulty bits in a group that can be identified by use of Eq. (10); the associated group pointer is determined by G j (S4r 35, s6, S7, = BJ(so, S I , S2, S S )~.
( 1 1 
Error control on check bits can be implemented according to the following relations. An error vector (eo, el, e2, e3)T affecting check bit group I (co-c3) results in Gs, = 1, n sk = 0, 0 S J 5 3, 4 5 k 5 8, k which leads to the determination of the associated group pointer as
In the same way, it can be verified that pointers for check bit group 2 (c4-c7) and group 3 (Cs) are defined as
Gc, = SO SI S2 S 3 Sq SS 3. 5 S7 Ss .
Correction of the check bits is then obtained using the following equations: 
Evaluation of the double-error-detection probability In order to evaluate the efficiency of the code, it is important to characterize its ability to identify multiple error conditions, Le., conditions that affect more than one group of the codeword. Furthermore, multiple-error-detection ability strongly relies on the amount of redundancy of the code that is not explicitly used for correction. As a consequence of the (b,k) code organization, no systematic way is known to determine the probability of detection of multiple errors [ 161.
The determination of this probability requires that a detailed study of the error combinations be performed. As a result of the inherent complexity of the procedure, and of the relative probability of multiple errors, the study reported here has been limited to the consideration of double errors only. The procedure consists in the characterization and enumeration of the various double-error combinations that would result in a wrong correction.
For example, if one considers a double-error combination (ern, e,l, ei2, e,3) and (ep, ejl, e,2, eJ3 ) affecting groups i and j , respectively, the problem is to identify the cases when these two errors induce an erroneous correction on group k; i.e., they can be viewed as a single equivalent error (em, ekl, ek2, ek3). Furthermore, it has to be noted that the error combination consisting of (ea, eil, ei2, (ep, ell, eJ2, e,3), (em, ekl, em, ek3), and all other error bits equal to zero, forms a valid codeword. Such an approach is investigated in detail hereafter for each error combination affecting the various groups of codewords. For better readability of the presentation, errors affecting data bits and check bits are considered separately and joint conditions are derived when possible.
Errors affecting data bit groups only
Basic conditions for miscorrection can be stated as e,, + e,, = ek, + 0, 0 5 rn 5 Equations (16) 3 , is equivalent to the single-group error (ek,,JT, which induces miscorrection of group k. Nevertheless, two more analogous conditions have to be considered, which can be obtained by rotation of subscripts i, j , and k, i.e.,
(e,,)' + ( e d T -+
One should note that this remark holds for the other cases that are investigated hereafter in this section.
One single error which affects the check bit groups
The cases corresponding to the three groups forming the check bits are described successively.
Error affecting thefirst group (co-c3)
In this case, the conditions to be considered can be expressed as ei, + ej, = e, f 0, 0 I m I 3;
and from (81, it follows that s , = 0, which leads to Bi(en, eil, eiz, + Bj(ep, eji, eJ2, e,dT
From a practical point of view, it is important to note that conditions (1 9) and (20) can be expressed analogously as relations (16) and (1 8) respectively, provided that 1) the error vector affecting the first check bit group is represented with the same notation as for data bit groups, and the subscript 16 is introduced, i.e., e, = eI6,, and 2) the null matrix 0 5 . 4 is included in the set of values of the shortened "B" matrices, i.e., B,+, = 05,4. The number of double-group error combinations satisfying the conditions stated by relations (1 7 ) and ( 19) is denoted N-.
Error affecting the second group (c4-c,)
It can be easily verified that this case corresponds to 
(24)
It has to be noted that conditions imposed by relations (22) and (24) can be considered jointly, provided that the error vector considered covers the error combinations just identified. Hereafter, NG is used to denote the number of such combinations.
(21)
Two errors which affect the check bit groups Here also, we distinguish the consequences of the errors affecting the various check bit groups.
Errors affecting groups I and 2
According to the form of the check matrix H", the conditions for miscorrection correspond to 
Errors affecting groups 2 and 3 According to the inherent properties resulting from the construction of the code, it is important to note that any doubleerror combination (e4, e5, e6, e7, 0), e8 = 1, affecting groups 2 and 3, represents an error vector on five adjacent bits that is perfectly identifiable and is thus correctable. It follows that such a form of error cannot induce erroneous correction on another single group of a codeword; in effect, in this case, the syndrome bits so+, are all equal to zero.
However, the benefit that can be expected from this added double-error-correction ability, resulting from the consideration of bits c4-c8 as a "single" group, has to be weighted with respect to the following points: 1) only 15 combinations on the total set of possible double-group error combinations are concerned, 2) due to the physical implementation of the system (groups of four bits), such a "single" error event is significantly less likely to occur than any actual single error event, and, moreover, 3) this "single" error is as likely to occur as any double error affecting other groups, which induces a tremendous increase in the number of miscorrections in the cases where these two errors have the same characteristics as a "single" error affecting check bits c4-c8. Such cases can be identified by the following relations: This explains the reason for limiting the correction ability of the code to single groups. Therefore, no case for miscorrection has to be considered for double errors affecting check bit groups 2 and 3, as they result in the activation of the two associated pointers and thus can be detected. The number of non-detected double-error combinations which affect the check bit groups is denoted N q . 
I
Determination of the double-error-detection probability A program has been developed which includes the three sets of conditions previously defined, in order to identify Nm, N-, and NG. It is important to note that all other double-error combinations will be detected hence, the doubleerror-detection probability is derived by reference to the total number of double-error combinations Nde. The determination of Nde is made easy by considering that the double-error combinations are characterized by the following: 1) if Cg is safe, the selection of two error groups among the remaining r + 3 groups that constitute a codeword; and 2) if cs is faulty, the choice of one group among r + 3. In both cases, it is considered that each group consists of four-adjacent bits, which corresponds to 15 distinct combinations. It follows that Nde is given by Nde = ( I ; ') X 15* + ( I t ' ) X 15.
Considering that all double-error combinations have a constant density function, the probability of double-error detection can thus be expressed as
The numerical evaluation of this probability is strongly related to the actual implementation of the code that was discussed previously. The description of three different coding schemes, as well as the evaluation of their respective error-detection ability, based on results introduced in this section, is presented in the next section.
Selection of a coding scheme
As implicitly stated in previous sections, a straightforward implementation of the code would consist in the consideration of data bits only (mb = 64) in the generation of check bits.
However, the network also conveys m.' = 20 address bits for selecting the memory word from each memory module. An extension of the monitored lines to these address lines is made possible without an increase in the number of check bits since mb + m.' < 124. This is desirable in order to enhance the range of covered faults. Figure 3 illustrates the general organization of the coding scheme for the two cases just discussed.
These schemes are investigated in detail subsequently with respect to their capability for error detection. Furthermore, an estimate of the hardware complexity of the considered implementations is indicated as well, based on the coding/decoding equations presented earlier.
Consideration of data bits only
Such a scheme allows for the correction of 1) all memory faults that affect any single four-adjacent-bit groups in a word, and 2) network faults affecting any single commutation module that conveys data and check bits. However, no detection is provided for errors on address bits resulting from either faults affecting the address decoding in memory modules or the commutation modules conveying the address lines. Despite this strongly restrictive range of covered faults, this scheme is interesting, as it is characterized by the more efficient ability to cope with double-group errors, and the associated figure for double-error-detection probability is used as an optimal reference benchmark for subsequently considered schemes. This property is directly related to the fact that only half of the redundancy potentially available is used.
In this case, r = 15, and thus the value of the total number of double-error combinations is easily derived from relation (28) and is equal to Nde = 34 695. The associated numbers of nondetected double-error combinations derived from conditions introduced previously are given in Table 2 . Application of relation (29) leads to P d d = 49.55 percent. It is important to note that this value is independent of the mode of implementation of the decoding scheme, since, in this case, redundancy provided by the code has to be fully used to correct all codeword bits. As far as the hardware complexity of this implementation is concerned, about 500 two-input logical functions were identified, among which almost three-fourths are exclusive-or functions. This value serves also as a reference benchmark for comparison with other implementations.
Inclusion of address bits
The main advantage of the inclusion of the address bits in the generation of the code is the added ability to cope with addressing errors resulting from faults affecting both memory and commutation modules. Address bits are not stored, and only check bits corresponding to the data and the address of the word in which they reside are stored, as indicated in Fig.  3 . Identification of addressing errors is then made possible when monitoring the syndrome vector. In practice, all addressing faults cannot be detected because of 1) the inherent limitation of code redundancy with respect to multiple faults, and 2) the different behaviors associated with read and write cycles. The first point has already been discussed; we stress here the difference that results whether the first manifestation of the fault occurs during a write cycle or a read cycle. This helps to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the scheme.
Let us consider first an addressing error occumng during a write cycle in the memory word of address X that results in a write in location previous data and check bits contained in Y(DC,) are overwritten by the new content (DC,) that was 166 addressed to X. In order to examine the consequences of this error on further read attempts, we distinguish two cases, considering that the initial fault is either permanent or transient.
If the fault is permanent, all further attempts to address X will attain Y, whose content is DCX. No error indication will appear in the processing of the syndrome, which is acceptable since expected data have been reached. On the other hand, any attempt to address Y in order to retrieve DCy will deliver DC,, which makes reference to address X in the memorized check bits. Thus, the concatenation of address bits sent Y and delivered information DC, constitutes an invalid codeword (in the limit of the inherent redundancy of the code), and the error can be identified.
Transient addressing faults considered here correspond to faults that vanish before any further read cycle is performed.
In this case, it is still possible to reach location X, but retrieved content DCi corresponds to the old value of the variable that has been stored in Y by error; such an error cannot be identified by the proposed scheme, as concatenation of X and DCi is a valid codeword. However, any attempt to access the data initially stored in Y(DCy) induces the same consequences as in the case of permanent faults.
In the case of an addressing fault, either transient or permanent, occumng during a read cycle of location X that results in the access of the content of Y (DCY), it can be verified that concatenation of retrieved content DCy and address sent X constitutes in both cases a nonvalid codeword and is thus identifiable.
It is also important to note that another consequence of the inclusion of the address bits in the generation of the check bits is constituted by the reduction of the double-errordetection probability of the code; this follows from the related increase of 1) the number of groups to process to generate the check bits, which leads to r = 20, and 2) the number ofdoubleerror combinations to account for, which is equal to Nded = 52 270. However, as opposed to the case where only data bits are considered, it is important to note that, due to the specific consequence of address faults that were just identified, only the detection and diagnosis of faults that affect address bits are of practical interest. Two implementations of the decoding policy have been considered, and these are now described and evaluated.
Basic implementation
The basic principle of this implementation is illustrated in Figure 4 . As previously discussed, during a memory read cycle, check bits related to the address sent and data read from memory are compared to the stored check bits in order to obtain the syndrome vector. Syndrome analysis allows for 1) identification of the error form, and 2) generation of the group pointers according to equations presented previously. Study of the different error forms results in the distinction of three principal cases identified in Fig. 4. 
1.
No error indication appears and data are directly delivered without entering the correction circuit.
2. A single group error is diagnosed and all the bits (data + address + check) pass through the correction circuit to restore the erroneous group; corrected bits are then sent back to the syndrome generator and equality to zero of the output is tested before corrected data are delivered to the processor module. This feedback-type correction is known as the wraparound correction [ 181; it ensures that the corrected word constitutes a valid codeword and allows detection of faults that could occur in the correction state. 3. This case corresponds basically to noncorrectable errors (double error, for example); an interrupt signal has to be generated in order to process this case by investigation of error characteristics. Note also that this form of error diagnosis must include any error (yet single) in the address bit groups.
According to this implementation, for which correction of all bits is performed before data are delivered in the case of single-error indication, conditions for miscorrection resulting from double errors that were presented previously are still valid, provided that 1) five supplementary shortened matrices are included in the set of "BT matrices, where i = 0, I , . . . , r = 20, according to the correspondence stated in Table I It follows that this implementation leads to the numbers of nondetected double-error combinations indicated in Table 3 . Thus, the value of the probability of double-error detection is P d d = 34.27 percent. This figure shows that the obtained benefit in addressing error identification, resulting from the inclusion of address bits in the generation of the check bits, results in a relative P d d decrease of more than 30 percent in this implementation.
Considering the hardware overhead associated with this implementation, a basic estimation leads to 744 two-input functions, which corresponds to a relative increase of 48 percent with respect to the previous implementation.
Modlfied implementation
The major cause in the significant degradation of p d d observed for the previous implementation lies in the constraint imposed by the wraparound correction, which requires that correction be applied on all groups. A modification of the implementation which eliminates the wraparound correction has been Table 3 Number of nondetected double errors-monitoring of data and address bits-basic implementation.
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investigated in order to improve the probability of doubleerror detection. The modified implementation is described in Figure 5 . Furthermore, two important points justify this modification: 1) it is not necessary that corrected check bits be delivered to the processor modules, and thus no correction circuit is needed for the check bits, and 2) activation of pointers corresponding to address groups has to initiate an error processing at the system level. The latter point is interesting since it involves a double error leading to erroneous identification of a single error on the address groups resulting in a detection decision (with possible erroneous diagnosis) but not in a miscorrection leading to system failure. It follows that conditions on nondetected double errors become more restrictive than the ones presented previously. These new conditions are now investigated. Modifications of conditions (22) and (24) require consideration of only the following cases, where cgi identifies check bit group i:
Finally, conditions (25) and (26) have to be restricted with respect to the variation of subscript i in the cases where the resulting error affects address bits, which leads to
The associated numbers of double-error combinations that will be miscorrected are given in Table 4 ; this leads to a probability of detection of double group errors equal to Pded = 48.44 percent, which compares very well with the benchmark figure corresponding to the classical implementation of the code. This figure clearly shows the efficiency of the modified implementation.
The hardware overhead to consider in this case is characterized by an increase of 32 percent with respect to the estimation presented for the case where only data bits are monitored in the construction of the code.
These results, along with the address-error-detection abilities of this code, clearly show the efficiency of this modified implementation.
Conclusion
An efficient error-correcting scheme designed to be implemented on a supercomputer system has been presented. The problem of primary memory data error protection is crucial in such systems due to the unusually large capacity and the 168 complexity and length of computations to be performed.
Based on structural considerations inherent in the system, the considered code is a shortened redundant (5,l)-adjacent code intended for single four-adjacent error correction. Such a code has been selected mainly for its ease of derivation and implementation. Different schemes for application of the code have been investigated and evaluated, taking into account both the range of faults covered and the double-error-detection property. From this study, a preferred scheme that includes both data bits and address bits in the construction of the code has been selected. In particular, it has been shown that such a scheme compares very well, on the basis of double-errordetection capability, with a classical coding scheme for which only data bits are considered in the generation of the check bits; the evaluation indicated a relative degradation of less than 2.5 percent. Moreover, another main advantage of this scheme is its ability to detect addressing errors. Quantitative evaluation of the efficiency of this added detection ability is difficult because, as it has been shown, it relies heavily on both the time characteristics of the errors and the sequencing of write and read cycles. Nevertheless, as indicated by the presented qualitative study, a large proportion of addressing faults can be detected; clearly these detection properties are limited by the inherent redundancy provided by the code.
As a closing remark, it is important to stress that such an error-correcting scheme, including both data and address bits in the generation of check bits, and characterized by an implementation based on the correction of data and check bits only, constitutes an efficient mechanism that allows for 1) correction of memory and network single four-adjacent errors, 2) detection of a large proportion of single four-adjacent addressing errors, and 3) detection of about half of double four-adjacent errors affecting either data, address, or check bits. 
Note
